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CONTEMPORARY CHECHNYA CONFLICT
– NATION-LIBERATION FIGHT OR TERRORISM
The events of 11 September 2001, bloody terrorist attacks in Middle East, Bali Is-
land, Dubrovka, Madrid or London, like thousands of other terror acts, depict how diffi-
cult, complicated and, at the same time, dangerous and unexpected phenomenon we
deal with.
Terrorism can undoubtedly be labeled on of the most important global problem of
the present world. Its indications occur with different frequency, force or dynamics in
almost all parts of our globe causing significant loss both human and material. It hap-
pens so despite involvement of many organizations, countries, people or institutions to
fight it1.
Problem of violence, terror and terrorism is an issue of deep historical roots. Its di-
verse forms have been present almost forever. Cause of terrorism is a composition of
a number of different conditions, amongst which are not only political, ideological, reli-
gious, nationalistic or territorial aspects, but also cultural, historical or often neglected
socio-economic ones2.
Definition of terrorism is a complicated question. Despite years of attempts and ex-
istence of hundreds (more than 300) very different definitions, international society
was not able to elaborate one universal and commonly accepted one. In the beginning
ideological as well as methodological aspects were an obstacle. Presently, we can ob-
serve a conflict of business, for example between countries voting for or against ex-
cluding from its regulations acts connected with national liberation fight or accepting or
negating a concept of national terrorism. Another difficulty in thorough and detailed
presentation of problem of terrorism is a constantly spreading research area of this no-
tion. As time passes by, particular terrorist organizations start or cease to exist, a form
or evaluation of its performance changes, but also new sorts of this phenomenon are
created. To give an example: eco terrorism, bioterrorism, cyber terrorism or global ter-
rorism3.
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Nevertheless, it is worth elaborating on notions such as: ‘terror’, ‘terrorism’, and
‘nation liberation fight’. Initially terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ were used interchange-
ably. They were referred to forms of running governments by terrorizing society with
mostly bloody repressions against political opponents. Currently both these terms have
been given a different meaning, influenced in the last century by inflicting violence by
individuals or groups of people against governments forcing various concessions. On
the other hand, Bernanat claims that the notion of terror should be understood as a very
specific type of regime or instrument applied by governments to keep the power4.
The notion of terrorism is often misinterpreted with nation liberation fight. Al-
though most movements fighting for independence of their countries these days have
applied terror act, for example Palestine Liberation Organization before founding of Pal-
estinian Autonomy and their classification often depends on economic trend or political
pressures, for example not condemning a national terrorism of Israel against Palestinians
or acts of UCK in Kosovo and Macedonia under flag of international peace forces, yet the
notion of terrorism and fight for independence will never be synonymous5.
Similar doubts connected with ‘terrorism’ or ‘nation liberation fight’ appear also in
reference to actions led within Chechnya conflict. This conflict in its advanced form
(not taking into consideration the historical background) started after the fall of USSR
with a number of national communities aiming to improve their status within the repub-
lics which had gained independence. One such community are Chechens – about 1 mil-
lion people. Their motherland lies on the northern slopes of the Caucasus mountains on
the Terek river. The Republic of Chechnya has an area of 19,3 thousand square meters,
which is 1% of overall Russia territory. Ethnic structure of this republic is: 56% of
Chechens, 13% of Ingushs, 31% of Russians and peoples of Dagestan. In 18th century
Chechnya was conquered by Russians, in 1859 it became a part of the Russian Empire.
The Chechens did not want to reconcile with losing independence and led military ac-
tions with different intensity in 19th century. They did not cease their resistance in 20th
century when they rebelled against collectivization of villages. In their military fight
for independence they were even willing to accept it from Germans. Therefore, on Sta-
lin’s command on 23 Feb 1944 the Chechen nation was uprooted to Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. Only after 13 years of life in exile in 1957 Chechens were able to come
back to their homeland. Yet, they suffered a terrible human loss. In the beginning of the
90’s Chechens intensified their striving to gain a status of an independent country. They
wanted to be free, which has always been their will. The authorities of the Russian Fed-
eration rejected these aspirations. Instead of looking for compromise in democratic
ways, Russian army entered Chechnya to overcome any independence movements.
Military actions brought huge destruction to the capital (Grozny) and other cities.
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Lots of Chechens and Russian soldiers died. Civil population suffered a great loss.
Nowadays, a search for peace solutions to settle the range of autonomy within the Rus-
sian Federation is on. In 1996 war ended, Russian army retreated from Chechnya and
Presidential election (27.01.1997) was won by Aslan Maskhadov6.
In the beginning period of this quasi-independence of Chechnya, Moscow was try-
ing to find ways to influence and maintain control over the republic without army’s in-
terference. The strategy applied assumed delaying talks about Chechnya’s status. The
Kremlin aspired for economic bound of the Republic with the Russian Federation. Rus-
sian authorities were trying to convince that without Moscow’s economic help,
Chechnya’s economy does not stand a chance for any development. Another idea aimed
at controlling the republic was creating a free economic zone on the territory of
Chechnya. As a result, the Caucasus Republic would be able to lead independent eco-
nomic policy remaining at the same time within the structures of the Russian Federa-
tion. A substantial element of the policy was oil, which was supposed to be the basis for
Chechnya’s independence7.
Chechnya remained in an international isolation and Aslan Maskhadov was trying
to bring it to the end. Apart from Afghanistan run by Talibs, it was not acknowledged by
international community. Maskhadov tried to establish contacts with Muslim countries.
Therefore, he met with Fahd, the King of Saudi Arabia. He also went to Turkey. He also
visited non-Islamic countries, in October 1998 he came to Poland, too. He tried to win
the US for the Chechnya’s cause. However, the Russian Federation threatened that it
will break off any diplomatic relations with the western countries if they acknowledge
Chechnya as an independent country. For western countries Russia was far more impor-
tant partner, that is why no country acknowledged Chechnya’s independence8.
Kidnapping of journalists, Russian politics as well as citizens of other countries
organized by some Chechen military organizations have become a serious problem
for Chechnya. The criminal actions were mostly supposed to obtain ransom. The
kidnapping was arranged by both internal and external forces to destabilize Aslan
Maskhadov’s regime. The Chechen authorities explained that kidnapping was orga-
nized by Russian secret service to discredit Chechnya in the eyes of Russian society.
The Chechen authorities were also struggling with crime connected with drug dealing
and oil theft. The situation in the country was deteriorating in even greater chaos, which
had been additionally enforced by attempts to assassinate President Aslan Maskhadov.
A state of emergency introduced in the middle of 1998 did not help at all9.
Contemporary Chechnya conflict – nation-liberation fight or terrorism 105
6 Czeczeñski konflikt, in: Cz. Mojsiewicz, Leksykon problemów miêdzynarodowych i konfliktów
zbrojnych, Wroc³aw 2001, p. 30–31. See also: A. Czajowski, Problemy narodowoœciowe w Rosji;
J. Achmadow, Krótki zarys historii Czeczenii, in: Z badañ nad wspó³czesn¹ problematyk¹ pañstw
Europy Œrodkowej i Wschodniej, eds. J. Albin, J. M. Kupczak, Wroc³aw 2000; A. WoŸniczak,
Wygrana wojna i przegrany pokój. Konflikt rosyjsko-czeczeñski w latach 1994–1999, in: Wspó³czesne
spory i konflikty miêdzynarodowe. Studia przypadków, ed. A. Potyra³a, Poznañ 2007.
7 J. Lemm, Okres quasi-niepodleg³oœci Czeczenii w latach 1996–1999, w: Konflikty wspó³czes-
nego œwiata, eds. G. Ciechanowski, J. Sielski, Toruñ 2006, p. 101–108.
8 J. Modrzejewska-Leœniewska, Konflikt rosyjsko-czeczeñski 1994–2006, in: Konflikty kolonial-
ne i postkolonialne w Afryce i Azji 1869–2006, ed. P. Ostaszewski, Warszawa 2006, p. 785.
9 J. Lemm, Okres quasi-niepodleg³oœci Czeczenii…, op. cit., p. 103–104.
An answer to crisis and improvement of economic situation was supposed to be
brought by Islam, to which a part of Chechen politicians turned. Maskhadov, as a new
President needed ideological support, which religion guaranteed. Islam was also neces-
sary to maintain coalition with Shamil Basayev Movladi Udugov. On 8 June 1997 the
President of Chechnya proclaimed the republic an Islamic country. He justified his de-
cision by the necessity to rebuild order in the country. He was in favor of introducing
a soft version of Islam, that is Sharia was supposed to be supplemented by the rules of
Chechen customary law. Against a total introduction of Sharia into Chechnya was
Mufti Achmed Kadyrov who claimed that Chechen society is not mature enough to
fully accept the rules of Islam. Nevertheless, religion did not help to fight the ever
growing crime in Chechnya. What is more, any attempts to introduce Muslim regula-
tions in the republic ended up in greater split among Chechen establishment10.
Islamic fundamentalism appeared in the republic, which claimed slogans about
unity of Muslim countries of Northern Caucasus, especially Chechnya and Dagestan.
The Chechen fundamentalism was represented by Udugov and Yandarbiyev. Mask-
hadov’s failures to agree upon Chechnya’s status with Russia gave more impetus to the
extremists. A fundamentalist movement, Wahhabism was able to lead propaganda and
military actions thanks to great financial potential. The extremists aimed at seize power
in Chechnya to consequently introduce radical Islam rules in the country. Initially,
Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduyev were opposing Wahhabists. Eventually, they also
joined the Islamic fundamentalists11.
Crisis in Russian-Chechen relations was developing with growing problems of
the government both in the Russian Federation and Chechnya. Aslan Maskhadov’s
real concern was a growing position of radical opposition as well as lack of power to
overcome the situation in the country. On the other hand, situation in Russia, where
struggling for power was going on, caused Moscow’s policy look indecisive and incon-
sistent. Another tensions in Russian-Chechen relations were caused by military occur-
rences on the Chechen-Dagestan border. More and more frequent attacks on Russian
posts led to Moscow’s impatience towards the situation in this region. Terrorist attacks
were aggravating the situation, military raids to neighboring republics were gradually
deteriorating relations between Chechnya and the Russian Federation. Furthermore,
any attempts to meet Maskhadov with Yeltsin ended in a fiasco, because of constant in-
cidents on the Dagestan border. Republic’s camp commanders also did not want the
meeting of the presidents, as it would probably build up Maskhadov’s position. Never-
theless, Sergei Stepashin, Russia’s prime minister met with the Chechen president. The
main issue was the situation in Chechnya and its economic problems. An important
declaration on behalf of the Russian Federation’s prime minister was the promise that
federal forces would not be used against Chechnya. He reasoned his statement by the
fact that Russia needs a strong Chechnya with strong Maskhadov’s position. The prom-
ise however, had not been kept12.
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Another Russia’s military intervention was in a short run. The reasons for the outbreak
of the second Caucasus War are to be found in frequent attacks on the Dagestan-Chechen
border. On 7 August 1999 joined forces of Chechens led by Shamil Basayev and a Jorda-
nian, el-Chattab entered Dagestan. Some powers in Russia and Chechnya were also aiming
at the open conflict as well. The reason for another military intervention of the Russian Fed-
eration army were also bomb attacks in Moscow and Volgodonsk in August and September
that year, which Chechen terrorists had been blamed for. Accusations aroused that it might
have also been Russian secret service provocation13.
In the beginning of 2000 Russia declared the end of Chechen war. The Kremlin au-
thorities declared introduction of normalization of life standards. However, this ‘nor-
malization’ meant cruelty of Russian soldiers towards Chechen peoples14.
On 23 October 2002, right after the end of a break in ‘Nord-Ost’ ensemble, the thea-
tre stage was seized by man wearing black clothes. They declared that the audience had
become their hostages. Initially the audience thought it had been just another director’s
idea. Yet, when these men started shooting in the air it became clear that this situation is
really serious. About 40 terrorists seized the theater with more than 800 people. They
planted bombs on the walls, columns, and chairs. There were also women-terrorists
wearing bombs on their bodies. All TV stations stopped their programs to broadcast
news about seizing the Dubrovka theater. As a result of attack, all terrorists died. How-
ever, 129 hostages died a s result of gas used during the action and poor rescue opera-
tion. Another 40 people died 6 months after the attack15.
The tragedy in Dubrovka showed that Moscow has no concept for ultimate solution
of Chechen conflict. Despite some successes in eliminating field commanders, it still
tried to introduce conflict into the global antiterrorist campaign. On the other hand,
a young radical Chechen generation of field commanders were motivated to destroy re-
public. Ahmad Kadirov’s pro-Moscow administration occurred to be weak as well. His
people did not possess resources to reconstruct Chechnya, especially to help the civil-
ians. They were labeled corrupt collaborators by people living in the Republic. An at-
tempt to ‘Chechen’ all aspects of life, occurred to be inefficient, as it led to larger
inter-clan splits16.
On 1 September 2004 in school number 1 in Beslan, a small town in Northern Oseti
another tragedy happened. Chechen terrorists seized the school taking hostages, also
children who came to inauguration of the school year. On 3 September, that is on the
third day of seizure, it had been agreed that catastrophe liquidation service and FSB of-
ficers will take corpses of men killed on the first day. The action was going well until
suddenly two loud explosions were heard. From that moment, everything was happen-
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ing fast. Armed citizens, who had taken their positions before, started shooting of the
school. The situation went totally out of control. Special units started attack. On the
other hand, terrorists detonated bombs and started killing hostages. Consequent actions
caused even greater chaos on the streets around the school. Many hours after the attack
shootings and detonations could be heard. Broken flowers brought to the beginning of
the school year were slowly drying in blood pools. Russian journalists reporting from
Beslan were belying facts. They did not give the exact number of hostages, just like in
case of Moscow theater17.
As a result of the operation of pro-Moscow military units subordinate to Ramsan
Kadyrov in 2005 Aslan Amskhadov, the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
who had not been acknowledged by the Russian authorities, died. He was a leader of
a country fighting for self-determination. He also might have been an indispensible
partner to solve the Chechen conflict. Maskhadov’s death shattered possibilities to ter-
minate a conflict more and more destabilizing the Northern Caucasus. It also buried any
hopes for political dialog with moderate separatists18.
As Falkowski from Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw points out:
Arenewed outbreak of an open armed conflict in Chechnya appears to be unlikely in the
nearest future. The militants are too weak to defeat the federal troops or even challenge
their positions, and the people in Chechnya are too exhausted with over a decade of
fighting to become actively involved on the militants’ side. However, this does not
mean that Chechnya will now experience lasting stabilization. In the coming years,
skirmishes, attacks and other acts of violence will probably continue, albeit on a local
scale. It is very probable, though, that the main theatre of the all-Caucasian armed con-
flict will be moved to Dagestan and Ingushetia. In the longer term, however, a new
Chechen rising against Moscow appears to be inevitable, and this may take the form of
a fight for national liberation or for the Islamic cause. Even though people in Chechnya
today are not capable of another independence rising, it is possible that the question of
separating Chechnya from the Russian Federation will be raised again within the next
few decades. If such an outbreak indeed takes place, it will probably be led by the ‘sys-
temic’ separatists who form the current pro-Russian government of Chechnya. This
may be a peaceful movement or a new armed rebellion, depending in principle on the
Kremlin’s reaction to its emergence. If Moscow responds the way it did in 1994, with
a military intervention, this may lead to another Chechen war for national liberation. If,
however, the Russian government starts dialogue with Chechen leaders, Chechnya may
gain de facto independence, or even separate peacefully from the Russian Federation19.
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The ethos of national liberation, which is strongly rooted in the Chechen society,
and the common hatred of Russia are among the factors that make the scenario outlined
above appear probable. These sentiments are reflected not only in the political concepts
and works of Chechen writers, poets, bards, etc, but also in the views of ordinary
Chechens, both in Chechnya and abroad. The nationalist outlook of the current
Chechen leaders and their demands for ever broader autonomy within the Russian Fed-
eration also suggest that the Chechen national liberation movement may be reborn. In
this situation, it seems unlikely that the Chechens should refrain from trying to create an
independent state of their own again. However, it seems even more probable that if
a new rising against Russia breaks out in Chechnya, it will not be a fight for national lib-
eration, but rather a battle for the ideas of Islam. In that case, the Chechens will not fight
alone, but together with the other Muslim nations of the North Caucasus. The rebellion,
initiated by the Islamists, will aim to ‘liberate’ the Caucasus from Russian rule and cre-
ate an Islamic state or states in the region. It may spread to the entire North Caucasus,
and will probably be directed not only against Moscow but also the local, secular gov-
ernments. If such a rebellion takes place, Russia will risk losing the whole region. This
scenario will be possible if the militants manage to strengthen their positions and win
wider public support in all republics of the North Caucasus in the immediate future. It
will also take the emergence of a charismatic spiritual leader capable of establishing
himself in a position of authority among the militants and at least some sections of the
society. The degree of support that the movement will have among the Muslim societies
of the North Caucasus will in turn depend on the results of Russia’s policy in the region,
among other factors. If Russia proves capable of stabilizing the Caucasus by moderniz-
ing the region, improving the social and economic conditions and integrating the Cau-
casian societies with the Russian Federation, it is possible that this scenario will not
materialize. Otherwise, frustration will probably rise in the region, leading to the out-
break of an armed conflict spanning the entire region, especially if the Kremlin contin-
ues its current policy of brutal repression, efforts at centralization, etc.20
The evolution of the conflict towards a Caucasian jihad and the emergence of Is-
lamic armed groups, constantly growing in strength, are among the facts suggesting
that the ‘Islamic’ scenario may indeed become reality. The exceptionally rapid growth
of the number of young Muslim radicals in all the Caucasus republic, and especially in
Dagestan, and the lack of prospects for any rapid improvement in the social and eco-
nomic situation in the region, also indicate that the situation there may develop accord-
ing to the above scenario. The outbreak of an Islamic revolution in the North Caucasus
republics of the Russian Federation may also be catalyzed by the rise of the nationalis-
tic, xenophobic and fascist sentiments currently observed in Russia21.
The realization of the above scenarios will depend to a large extent on internal de-
velopments in the Russian Federation. A rebellion of the Chechens against Russia,
whether founded on the ideas of national liberation or the ideology of Islam, will be
more probable if Russia experiences a serious political crisis. Such an uprising will also
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be possible in the case of a serious economic crisis, which Russia may experience if the
prices of energy resources in world markets decline22.
If Bialko’s typology was taken into consideration, for whom terrorism means apply-
ing political influence with illegal use of force – enforcement or violence combined
with breaking the elementary social norms and settled in a given country rules of politi-
cal fight, based on intended intimidation and manipulating, achieving political objec-
tives by creating with acts an atmosphere of violence, and obstructing functioning of
a hostile social arrangement, and forcing decisions, and enemy’s actions by drastic tac-
tics of accomplished facts or forcible blackmail, as well as proposed by him subdivision
of terrorism on: 1) Nation liberation (probably most controversial one), 2) religious,
3) subversive, 4) repressive (question whether a term ‘terror’would be more justified in
this case, which has been mentioned before23), in case of Chechnya it would be:
– repressive terror, that is applied by the State, in this case Russian;
– terrorist actions of Chechen fighters.
There are two mainstreams in this case. First of all, we can deal with nation libera-
tion terror characterized by applying terrorist methods to achieve independence and
sovereignty by people living on a given area. Secondly, there exists terrorism relying on
manipulation of faith, making it an interpretation of actions, characterized by funda-
mentalism and fanaticism, operating with slogans of “war with infidels”.
Nowadays, Chechnya is Russia’s internal affair in the eyes of international public
opinion. A question of breaking the elementary human rights by federal army is not
dealt with, although there are more and more frequent gossips about Russia being
a country taking a lead in trading with human organs. New York terrorist attacks of
11 September helped the West to perceive this war as an element of international fight
with Islamic fundamentalism24.
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ist attacks of 11 September helped the West to perceive this war as an element of international
fight with Islamic fundamentalism.
WSPÓ£CZESNY KONFLIKT CZECZEÑSKI
– WALKA NARODOWOWYZWOLEÑCZA CZY TERRORYZM
STRESZCZENIE
Wydarzenia z 11 wrzeœnia 2001 r., krwawe zamachy terrorystyczne na Bliskim Wschodzie,
wyspie Bali, Dubrowce, w Madrycie czy Londynie, podobnie jak tysi¹ce wczeœniejszych aktów
terroryzmu, obrazuj¹ z jak bardzo trudnym, z³o¿onym, a zarazem niebezpiecznym i nieprzewi-
dywalnym zjawiskiem mamy do czynienia. Terroryzm bez w¹tpienia uznaæ mo¿na za jeden
z najistotniejszych problemów globalnych we wspó³czesnym œwiecie.
W artykule tym autor stara siê przybli¿yæ problem wspó³czesnego konfliktu czeczeñskiego,
który dziœ w oczach miêdzynarodowej opinii publicznej traktowany jest jako wewnêtrzna spra-
wa Rosji. Kwestia ³amania elementarnych praw cz³owieka przez wojska federalne nie jest po-
dejmowana, gdy¿ zamachy terrorystyczne z 11 wrzeœnia pozwoli³y Zachodowi postrzegaæ tê
wojnê jako element œwiatowej walki z fundamentalizmem islamskim.
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